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St. John's University School of Law 
Jones Act Seamen 
FL EET DOCTRINE APP LIES TO 
SH ORE-BASED RIGG ER 
WORKING ON BARG E 
Asserti ng the fleet docti ne, where p er­
manent assi gnment to group of vessels 
under common ownership can be 
shown, al lows a ri gger worki ng on 
floati ng p latforms to acqui re seaman 
status i n  a Jones Act acti on. 
(Gizoni v. Southwest Marine inc., CA9, 
56 F. 3d 1 138, 617195) 
Byron Gizoni (Gizoni), 
shore-based rigger and 
rigging foreman, was in­
jured when he stepped 
into a hole on the deck of 
Southwest Marine Inc.'s 
(Southwest's) floating 
pontoon barge or floating platform during 
repair of a U.S. Navy ship. The pontoon 
was secured to a floating dry dock being 
used to repair the ship's rudder. 
Southwest, Gizoni's employer, was sued 
under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688, 
on the claim that Gizoni was a seaman be­
cause of his work aboard the barges and 
watercraft owned by Southwest Marine. 
Although the Jones Act provides an in­
jured seaman a cause of action in negli­
gence, it does not define seaman for pur­
poses of the Act. 
The district court found Gizoni to be a 
harbor worker and therefore precluded 
from suing under the Act, granting South­
west summary judgment. The court of ap­
peals reversed. The appeals court found 
that the lower court had erred in its in­
structions to the jury on the definition of 
"seaman." In its remand for a new trial, 
the appeals court held: (I) that the fleet 
doctrine instruction should have been 
given; (2) evidence that Gizoni had been 
employed on a vessel in navigation was 
not misleading; (3) the court's instruction 
defining a vessel was erroneous; but that 
(4) the "permanent connection" instruc­
tion was correct. 
Gizoni, the ninth circuit noted, had to 
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that he was a "seaman." According to the 
Bullis test, to prove one is a seaman, he 
must be (I) employed on a vessel that is in 
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navigation; (2) permanently connected 
to that vessel; and (3) contributing to 
the function of the mission of the ves­
sel. Bullis v. Twentieth Century-Fox 
Film Corp., 474 F.2d 392, 393 (9th 
Cir. 1973). 
Gizoni claimed that the district court 
had erred by not instructing the jury on 
the fleet sea doctrine. The fleet doc­
trine, created by the fifth circuit to 
lower the requirement that a seaman 
had to be permanently assigned to a 
vessel, allows one to acquire seaman 
status through permanent assignment 
among multiple vessels under one 
common ownership. Campo v. Elec­
tro-Coal Transfer Corp., 970 F.2d 5 1 ,  
52 (5th Cir. 1 992), cert. denied, 1 1 3 
S.Ct. 126 1 ,  1 22 L.Ed.2d 659 ( 1 993). 
The appellate court determined that the 
fleet doctrine was a reasonable exten­
sion of Jones Act precedent. The court 
considered evidence that Gizoni had 
worked on a variety of barges for 
Southwest. The fleet doctrine was also 
applicable, ironically, because South­
west, in its closing argument, focussed 
on the fact that Gizoni could not prove 
that he was "more or less permanently 
attached" to a particular barge. There­
fore, the district court clearly erred in 
not giving the instruction. 
The district court, argued Gizoni, also 
erred by instructing the jury that Gi­
zoni had to prove that the situs of the 
accident occurred on a vessel in navi­
gation. Under the Jones Act, a seaman 
may recover for any injury that oc­
curred in the course of employment. 
0 'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & 
Dock Co., 3 1 8  U.S. 36, 63 S.Ct. 488, 
87 L.Ed. 596 (1943). Thus, whether or 
not the injury occurred on a vessel is 
irrelevant. Yet, in contrast, the judge's 
instruction to the jury implied Gizoni 
had to establish that he was employed 
on a vessel in navigation to recover. 
Further, said Gizoni, the district court 
clearly erred in instructing the jury 
with the following: "If the transporta­
tion function, if any, of the floating 
platform was merely incidental to its 
other functions, the floating platform 
cannot be found to be a vessel. * * * 
[T]o be a vessel, the purpose of the 
floating platform must, to some rea­
sonable degree, be the transportation 
of passengers, cargo or equipment 
from place to place across navigable 
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waters." Gizoni v. Southwest Marine Corp., 
56 F.3d 1 1 38, 1 1 42 (9th Cir. 1995). 
The court of appeals stated in previous de­
cisions that unusual-looking craft, whose 
purpose is not the transportation of persons 
or things, can be considered vessels under 
the Jones Act. Estate of Wenzel v. Seaward 
Marine Services, 709 F.2d 1 326 (9th Cir. 
1 983). Hence, the district court's instruc­
tion regarding the transportation function 
was also erroneous. 
Finally, the plaintiff contended that, when 
the district judge instructed the jury, 
''[Gizoni] had to establish that he had a more 
or less permanent connection with the vessel 
* * * [,]" that this implied that he was re­
quired to spend most of his time on that par­
ticular barge. The appeals court did not find 
this statement misleading. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, "the key to 
seaman status is employment-related con­
nection to a vessel in navigation." McDer­
mott Jnt'l v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, Il l 
S.Ct. 807, 1 1 2 L.Ed.2d 866 ( 1 99 1 ). 
The purpose of the connection requirement 
is not intended to allow an individual who 
works for an isolated period protection un­
der the Jones Act, but to protect the seaman 
who serves aboard one particular vessel for 
a brief time. THOMAS 1. SCHOENBAUM, AD­
MIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 6-9, at 263 
(2d ed. 1 994). 
Bryce A. Larrabee 
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IYRR Y ACH TING REG ULATIONS 
P REEMP T COLREG S 
In yacht col li si on case, findi ngs of Inter­
nati onal Jury p reemp t U. S. court's app li ­
cati on of Arti cl es 12 & 13 of the Conven­
ti on on Internati onal Regulati on for the 
P reventi on of Colli si ons at Sea 
( COLREG S). 
(Juno SRL v. SIV Endeavour, CAl, 58 
F.3d 1, 619195) 
On October 3, 1 992, two vessels, the 
Charles Jourdan and the Endeavour, were 
racing in the La Nioulargue Regatta in and 
around the Bay of St. Tropez. Although the 
yachts were racing on separate courses, the 
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courses converged near the entrance to 
St. Tropez Bay at a mark designated as 
"A." As it approached mark "A," the 
Charles Jourdan was sailing to lee­
ward and believed it had the right of 
way pursuant to International Yacht 
Racing Rule (IYRR) 37. 1 :  "[A] wind­
ward yacht shall keep clear of a lee­
ward yacht." The crew of the Endeav­
our failed to make an attempt to change 
course to windward until the last 
minute and as a result the boom of the 
Endeavour struck the backstay of the 
smaller Charles Jourdan, causing sub­
stantial damage. 
An International Jury was convened, 
as per the IYRR, to determine fault for 
the collision. The International Jury, 
applying the rules agreed to by the par­
ticipants in the race, found the Endeav­
our at fault. 
In September 1 993, the owner of the 
Charles Jourdan filed an action in ad­
miralty, seeking compensation for the 
damage sustained, and had the Endeav­
our arrested. The Endeavour's owners 
denied liability and counterclaimed for 
losses due to alleged false arrest of the 
vessel. The district court held that Ar­
ticles 1 2  and 1 3  of the Convention on 
International Regulation of Collisions 
at Sea (COLREGS), 33 U.S.C. § 1 600 
et seq., 33 C.F.R. § 80.01  et seq., pre­
empted application of the rules of a pri­
vate yacht racing organization. 
The district court ignored the findings 
of the International Jury and con­
cluded, under COLREGS Rule 1 3, 33 
U.S.C. foil. § 1 602, that the Charles 
Jourdan was an overtaking vessel re­
quired to keep clear of the Endeavour. 
Pursuant to the "Pennsylvania Rule," 
The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. ( 1 9  Wall.) 
1 25, 22 L.Ed. 1 48 ( 1 873), failure to 
abide by navigation rules creates a pre­
sumption of negligence. Accordingly, 
the Charles Jourdan was presumed to 
be at fault. The Endeavour's failure to 
take action to avoid the collision was 
found to be significant and was appor­
tioned 40% of fault. The court deter­
mined that the physical damage to the 
Charles Jourdan was valued at 
$ 10,000, which was reduced to $4,000. 
The first circuit, although noting that 
the COLREGS were historically meant 
to be the "international rules of the 
road for maritime traffic," 58 F.3d at 
4, also stated: "[N]othing in their his-
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tory, or in the public policy issues that led 
to their enactment, indicates that they 
were meant to regulate voluntary private 
sports activity in which the participants 
have waived their application and in 
which no interference with nonparticipat­
ing maritime traffic is implicated." !d. 
The court based its conclusion not only on 
the nature of the COLREGS and the pri­
vate activity involved, but also on the 
'·strong public policy in favor of the pri­
vate settlement of disputes." 58 F.3d at 5. 
The court traced through a number of ven­
erable English decisions the premise that 
"when one voluntarily enters a yacht race 
for which published sailing instructions 
set out the conditions of participation, a 
private contract results between the partic­
ipants." !d. Such a contract established 
the conditions under which the partici­
pants agreed to be bound. "The parties 
agreed to the substantive rules for deter­
mining fault, they agreed to the adjudicat­
ing forum, and they were apprised of the 
procedures. They appeared before [the In­
ternational Jury], submitted to its jurisdic­
tion, presented evidence and argument, 
and thereafter were served with that 
body's findings and final decision." 58 
F.3d at 6. 
The appeals court also took note of fed­
eral policy favoring arbitration under § 2 
of the Federal Arbitration Act, which 
specifically defines "collisions" as arbitra­
ble "maritime transactions." The two 
yachts had agreed to be contractually 
bound by the rules of the road as set forth 
in the IYRR. The court, finding that the 
IYRR procedures adequately addressed 
due process concerns, reversed the district 
court, commenting "It is hard to find fault 
with such a process, particularly when it is 
exactly what the participants agreed to." 
58 F.3d at 7. 
The first circuit, however, agreed with 
the district court that it had valid jurisdic­
tion over the damages issue, stating that 
courts were the rightful forum for the liti­
gation of damages, unless yacht racing au­
thorities .provided for private means of 
resolution. The court of appeals affirmed 
the district court's finding that there were 
$ 10,000 in damages resultant from the 
collision. However, the first circuit held 
that it was error for the lower court to have 
mitigated the damages by assessing the 
Charles Jourdan for comparative fault, 
since the International Jury had preemp­
tively found the Endeavour responsible 
for the 
collision, 
thereupon 
reinstating 
the full 
$ 1 0,000 
award to the 
Charles 
Jourdan. 
George M. 
Chalos 
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Maritime Cargo 
SUBSTITUTE VESSEL IS NOT A 
COG SA UNREASONABL E 
DEVIATION UNDER TERM S OF 
BILL OF L ADING 
A carri er's restowage of cargo onto a 
vessel di fferent from that ori gi nally 
named i n  a contract of carri age i s  not 
an "unreasonable devi ati on" from the 
contract i f  a provi si on allows for ves­
sel substi tuti on "to perform all or 
part of the carri age. " 
(Yang Machine Tool Co. v. Sea-Land 
Service, Inc., CA9, 58 F.3d 1350, 
6130195) 
The Yang Machine Tool Company 
(Yang Machine) contracted with Sea­
Land Service, Inc. (Sea-Land) to trans­
port a large horizontal machining center 
from China to California. Since the 
cargo was too large to fit inside a stan­
dard 40-foot enclosed container, it was 
secured by steel bands in two parts on 
open "flat racks," metal pallets without 
side walls or tops, and placed on board 
the Merchant Prince. The Merchant 
Prince carried the cargo from China to 
Yokohama, Japan, where it was off­
loaded onto the Sea/and Patriot for 
completion of the carriage to California. 
During loading onto the Sea/and Pa­
triot, a hoisting cable broke, resulting in 
damage to the cargo. 
The bill of lading identified the Mer­
chant Prince as the carrying vessel. 
Nothing in the bill indicated that the 
cargo would be restowed aboard the 
Sea/and Patriot. The bill contained a 
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